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1. Introduction  
    Machiel Mulder & Peter Perey 
 
1.1 Background 
In the evening of 16 August 2012, an earthquake with a magnitude of 3.6 
on the scale of Richter occurred near the village of Huizinge, in the 
northern part of the Netherlands. Immediately after the incident, 
numerous complaints about damage to houses were reported. The 
operator of the field, the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM), 
received over 1,000 damage reports in the week following this earthquake. 
It appeared that the earthquake was indeed induced by gas extraction 
from the Groningen gas field (Dost & Kraaijpoel, 2013).  
The relation between gas extraction from the Groningen field and 
seismic activity in the region is not a new phenomenon. In the past 
decades, several studies have showed this relationship. BOA (1993) 
concluded that gas extraction has an influence on the robustness of the gas 
reservoir and the direct surroundings. This report also concluded that 
earthquakes can be induced by gas extraction. Although this relation has 
been confirmed by the latest incidents, the initial assessment of the 
magnitude of the problem was not correct. BOA (1993) predicted that even 
in the worst case, there would be a small chance of minor damage around 
the epicentre. With the information which is currently available it is 
evident that this prediction was too optimistic. The province of Groningen 
has been struck by earthquakes numerous times over the past 25 years.  
Since the earthquake of Huizinge, over 100 earthquakes with a magnitude 
of 1.5 or more have been registered (Figure 1.1). After the Huizinge 
earthquake, there was a steep increase in the number of inhabitants 
reporting damage to their houses. In international comparison, the level 
of damage in Groningen is higher than would be expected given the 
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magnitude of the earthquakes (see Box 1.1). Until the beginning of 2018, 
over 85,000 damage claims have been filed (NCG, 2017).   
Figure 1.1. Total number of earthquakes with a magnitude >  
                      1.5 per year, categorised by magnitude, 1991-2018 
 
Source: NAM 
1.2 The Groningen gas field and its revenues 
The operator of the Groningen gas field has been a major player in North-
West European gas market. Since the discovery of this gas field, the 
importance of natural gas as energy source grew immensely in the 
Netherlands and its neighbouring countries. Natural gas became the 
primary energy source for households, for example for cooking and 
heating. The role of the gas production from Groningen changed in the 
following decades as the field got a more strategic function. Other small 
gas fields produced continuously over time, where the Groningen field was 
increasingly used in times of high demand. This so-called swing function 
of the Groningen field was meant to secure the supply of natural gas in 
Northwest Europe as well as to maximize the revenues. The revenues 
coming from this huge reservoir of natural resource had a major 
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contribution to the economic welfare of the Netherlands in the second half 
of the 20th century (CBS, various years). In the 1980s the share of the gas 
revenues in total government income peaked at 15%, but this contribution 
gradually decreased to about 2% currently. 
 
1.3 Policy debate 
The damage caused by earthquakes was initially settled between property 
owners and the NAM. In January 2014, the Dutch government stepped in 
with a set of additional compensating measures as well as the institution 
of a National Coordinator. One of the tasks of this coordinator was to 
manage the processes of damage repair and structural reinforcement of 
buildings. However, the NAM continued to have a large say in the handling 
of damage claims and this double role of the operator caused much 
discontent in the area. This led to the decision to transfer the management 
and financial compensation of damage claims to a government agency, 
which charges its costs to the NAM. However, the severity and magnitude 
Box 1.1: Geology – what causes the earthquakes? 
The natural gas of Groningen is located at 3 km deep, in a sandstone 
layer. Sandstone consists of sand that is pressed against each other 
under high pressure. When gas is pumped out of the sandstone layer, the 
pressure in this layer decreases. As the decreased pressure cannot 
support the weight of the layers on top, it results in soil subsidence that 
compresses the layers. When this compression occurs in an irregular 
way, the soil subsidence causes an earthquake. Gas-induced earthquakes 
in the sandstone layer occur at a shallow depth, compared to natural 
earthquakes that occur at 20-100 kilometres deep. As a result, the 
earthquakes induced by the gas production have a higher impact on 
buildings than natural ones. On top of that, ground movements are 
intensified because the seismic energy is transmitted by a subsoil of clay, 
sand and peat. Also, the predominant traditional construction in brick 
adds to the vulnerability of buildings (Koster & van Ommeren, 2015; 
McGarr, 1984; van Eck et al., 2006). 
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of the problem complicated the setup of a damage protocol. After the 
implementation of a protocol, different problems became apparent. These 
problems were related to the difficulty of the assessment of damage and 
often conflicting assessments by different experts.  To tackle the problems, 
the government implicated a new damage protocol. Starting from March 
19 2018, inhabitants can report their damage claim by the Commissie 
Mijnbouwschade Groningen. This replaced the old structure and has as 
purpose to accelerate the process.  
In addition, the government policy was directed at reducing the risks 
of earthquakes in the future as much as possible. In order to do so, the 
government further restricted the annual level of production from the 
Groningen field. The initial cap, which was introduced in 2006, of 425 
billion m3 (bcm) for a period of 10 years was introduced because of 
security of supply concerns. In order to reduce the risk of earthquakes, the 
Dutch government reduced this cap to an annual level of 27 bcm in 2015. 
Because of the persistent earthquakes, the cap has been lowered several 
times since then. In the case of an abnormal cold year, however, the 
production is allowed to be somewhat higher, to secure domestic supply 
and to prevent a shortage for the inhabitants of the Netherlands. In March 
2018, the Dutch government decided that the Groningen gas production 
will completely come to an end in 2030 (EZK, 2018). 
 
1.4 Responses in society 
The increasing intensity and frequency of the earthquakes led to a fierce 
debate among Dutch population, adding to the debate on the need to 
reduce the use of fossil energy.  The debate on gas production basically 
boils down to the trade-off between the national revenues of gas 
production and the importance of the Groningen gas field for the Dutch 
security of gas supply on the one hand and the risks and costs for the 
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inhabitants of the affected region. The latter group demanded immediate 
action of the government to prevent future quakes. Furthermore, over the 
past five years anger and frustration have grown regarding the 
compensation for the damage and value loss of their houses (KAW, 2018). 
Although a government agency has taken over the lead, the slow process 
of developing the new protocol on how to assess all the damage claims 
added to the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants.  
Several citizen interest groups have been established, including the 
Groninger Bodem Beweging and Schokkend Groningen. Another active 
interest group is the WAG Foundation, representing over 4.500 owners of 
houses, which won a court claim for compensation of the devaluation of 
their properties. These groups protested against gas production, by 
occupying buildings and protesting in front of the headquarter of the 
NAM. On January 19 2018, inhabitants of the earthquake affected region 
organised a torchlight procession as a protest towards the in their view 
passive attitude of the government and the operator. The dissatisfaction 
among the population after more than 5 years of uncertainty about how 
the problems caused by gas extraction would be solved appeared to be 
huge. Over 10,000 people were present and another 53,000 signed an 
online protest petition.  
The earthquakes did not only affect the overall wellbeing of the 
inhabitants of the region, it also affected the housing market. The 
uncertainty concerning the earthquakes makes the region less attractive 
and valuable. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the region are more likely 
to move away from the area, adding up to other factors negatively 






1.5 Structure of the paper 
In this paper, we want to give an overview of the economic and social 
consequences of both the gas production and the resulting earthquakes. 
Section 2 describes the role of the Groningen gas field in the gas market, 
while Section 3 goes into the historical economic importance of the 
Groningen gas production for the Dutch state revenues and economy. In 
the following sections, the effect of the earthquakes on the inhabitants of 
the Province in Groningen is discussed. Section 4 discusses the effect of 
the earthquakes on the housing market, while Section 5 treats the social-
psychological aspects in detail. Finally, Section 6 presents some lessons 
learned and discusses how to go forward. 
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2. Role of Groningen gas field in the gas market 
     Machiel Mulder and Peter Perey 
 
2.1 Characteristics of the Groningen gas field 
Natural gas is a natural product, which means that its characteristics vary 
from field to field. Different gas fields contain different types of natural 
gas that have different specifications and composures. The natural gas that 
is produced from the Groningen gas field is qualified as L-gas, referring to 
low-calorific gas. The qualification of natural gas, either low-calorific or 
high-calorific, depends on the Wobbe-Index of the gas. The Wobbe-index 
indicates the thermic value of a gas (Klimstra, 1986). Gas with a low-
calorific value contains a higher percentage nitrogen and lower percentage 
of methane than high-calorific gas, resulting in a lower Wobbe-index. 
Therefore, the amount of thermal energy stored in a unit low-calorific gas 
is lower than in the same unit of high-calorific gas. The Groningen field 
has a higher nitrogen (14,2%) content compared to other European gas 
sources, such as Russian or Norwegian gas (ca. 2%).  
The energetic quality of the natural gas is not the only key 
characteristic for a gas field. Another characteristic is how complicated the 
extraction of natural gas from the field is. This difficulty of extraction is 
reflected in the so called marginal production costs. If the price which will 
be received for the natural gas is lower than these marginal-extraction 
costs the producer will not produce at all. Looking at this characteristic, 
Groningen has a huge advantage compared to other fields. Its marginal 
costs belong to the lowest in Europe. In addition, the production level from 
Groningen can be adjusted from hour to hour relatively cheaply and 
quickly. This gives the operator of the field the advantage to vary the 
output level according to market circumstances. In other words, the 
operator can increase output when demand (and price) is high and 
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decrease output if output falls. Therefore, the Groningen field is often 
referred to as a swing supplier. That this option of being a swing supplier 
is exploited in the past becomes apparent when looking at the detailed 
production data. It appears that the supply from Groningen peaks in 
winter periods and is relatively low in the summer. So, the Groningen gas 
is primarily used to meat peak demand during winter time when the gas 
price is higher (see Figure 2.3).  
 
2.2 Dutch gas-market policies  
Since the discovery of the Groningen gas field near the village Slochteren, 
the Dutch gas policy changed multiple times. At the time of discovery, gas 
markets did not play an important role, and the overall belief was that in 
the future, all energy would be retrieved from nuclear power (see Correljé 
& Verbong, 2004). Therefore, in the 1960’s, the objective was to deplete 
the Groningen gas field as fast as possible. An additional objective of the 
Dutch government was to secure gas supply for at least 25 years.  
In the following decade, the view on the domestic natural resources 
changed drastically. The oil crisis showed the strategic importance of 
natural resources. This change in view led to a transformation of the 
Western energy policies.  In the Netherlands, the Groningen gas field was 
suddenly a huge strategic storage worth to preserve. In terms of policy, 
this was translated into the introduction of the Kleineveldenbeleid, an 
offtake guarantee for small fields, in 1974. The incumbent operator of the 
Dutch gas system, Gasunie, was required to buy gas from small fields in 
favour of gas from the Groningen field (GasTerra, 2017). This resulted into 
higher returns for these fields, enabling the preservation of the Groningen 
gas field to be used for flexibility purposes (EZ, 2004). As could be 
expected, the offtake guarantee led to lower production levels from the 
Groningen gas field (Figure 2.1). As a result, the pace of depleting the 
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Groningen field reduced as well. The current magnitude of gas reserves in 
this field is estimated at about 500 bcm, which is still about 1/5 of the size 
more than 50 years ago (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.1. Gas extraction in the Netherlands, 1963-2016  
Source: NAM, CBS  
 
Figure 2.2. Gas reserves in the Groningen gas field, 1963-2018 
Source: NAM, CBS 
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Until begin 2000’s, Groningen production was regulated by a maximum 
allowed production of all Dutch gas fields of 80 billion m3 (see Table 2.1). 
The maximum allowed production of Groningen was thus determined by 
the difference between this maximum and the actual production of smaller 
fields (Mulder & Zwart, 2006). 
Table 2.1. Production cap on the Groningen gas field per gas  
                    year 














December 22, 2005 2006 42.5 (425 in 
period of 10 
years) 
 




June 24, 2016 2016-2017 24   
April 18, 2017 2017-2018 21.6  
March 29, 2018 2022 12  
 2023-2029 Gradual 
reduction 
 
 2030 0  
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ) 
 
However, the production of small-fields was expected to decline quickly. 
Therefore, to prevent the rapid depletion of the Groningen gas field and to 
maintain the flexibility of this field, a cap on the production of Groningen 
was imposed (EZ, 2005). The policy implementation consisted of a cap on 
                                                          
1 A gas year runs from October till September, so the cold-weather period with 
high demand is in the beginning of the year. This is done to minimalize the chance 
of a constraint with the cap.  
15 
 
the production level of the Groningen field over a longer period of time. 
For the period 2006-2015, the cap was set on 425 bcm without an annual 
restriction. So, the producer could choose any yearly production level, 
provided that the production over 10 years did not exceed 425 bcm. For 
the period of 2010-2020, the same cap of 425 bcm was imposed. 
 
In the 1990’s, the European energy markets were liberalised. The goal was 
to foster competition which should lead to lower energy prices. A 
Box 2.1: Dutch natural resources law 
In contrast to other countries, the Dutch State is owner of all natural 
resources and minerals from a depth of 100 metres. According to the 
mijnbouwwet the Dutch government is allowed to outsource the mining 
to a so-called concession holder. This concession holder has a monopoly 
on the resources and minerals and their revenues (Art. 143.2 
Mijnbouwwet). Under normal circumstances, the concession holder can 
choose his production plan autonomously. The Dutch State is only 
allowed to interfere under special conditions. These conditions include: 
changed insights in the planned use or management of minerals, safety 
considerations and prevention of damage to properties.  
Furthermore, the license holder has to take all measures that can 
reasonably be required to prevent that the mining activities cause 
damage. The Minister may stipulate that security must be provided to 
cover the liability for the damage that is caused by the movement of the 
earth as a result of the extraction of minerals. 
It is established that there has to be a Technische commissie 
bodembeweging, which has to advise and inform the Minister and 
potential affected inhabitants about damage caused by mining activities. 
Finally, it is determined that there has to be a Waarborgfonds 
mijnbouwschade. From this fund, damages can be paid whenever the 
concession holder in unable to pay for it. 
Next to compensation for damage to properties, the Dutch 
Government established other measures to compensate for the damage 
in Groningen. These measures include risk reduction, buy out, 
compensation for property loss and subsidies. A more detailed review of 
these measures is given in chapter 4. 
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consequence of the restructuring of the gas market was that the gas system 
was no longer controllable by a single party. Despite the liberalisation of 
the gas market, the Dutch government remained involved in the 
production of Dutch gas, based on the legal framework of the natural 
resources law (see Box 2.1).  
Although the regulation of the production volume from the 
Groningen field is not a new phenomenon, the reason behind the 
regulation from the government has changed. Where historical policies 
regarding the gas market where focused on future security of supply, the 
latest policy change has a new cause. After the earthquake of 2012 near 
Huizinge, the main reason for the change in policy was the risk following 
from gas-extraction induced earthquakes. The Dutch government 
announced that the cap of 425 bcm on a 10-year basis would be replaced 
by an annual cap of 27 bcm in 2015. This cap is now gradually lowered 
several years. The current production cap for the Groningen gas field is 
21.6 bcm. On March 29 2018, the Dutch government announced the end 
of gas production in Groningen2. The maximum production from 
Groningen will decline gradually in the period 2022 and 2030. In 2030 no 
gas will be produced anymore from the Groningen gas field. 
 
2.3 Groningen gas field in the European gas market  
To be able to identify the role of the Groningen gas field in the gas market, 
it is necessary to know which components make up this market. In other 
words, who are the agents on the supply and demand side of the market? 
As told before, the quality of natural gas differs between different sources. 
The different types of natural gas have both different consumers and 
producers.  





Looking at the demand profile of natural gas in the Netherlands, some 
clear distinctions can be seen. Industrial demand is relatively flat over 
time, as demand is not seasonally bounded. Industrial usage of natural gas 
is for the purpose of large scale heat generation or feedstock in industrial 
processes. Given this usage of the natural gas, the type of gas with a higher 
Wobbe-index is preferred by this type of user. Therefore, the natural gas 
that goes to industrial demand is high-calorific gas. Consumer demand 
and exports, which are mainly meant for foreign residential consumers, 
have high seasonal flexibility. This follows from the fact that the natural 
gas demanded by these groups is mainly used for heating. Both demand 
categories with high seasonal flexibility, are supplied by natural gas with 
a low calorific value. As a result, the demand in winter times is 
significantly higher than during summer time.  This seasonal component 
of gas demand results in a seasonal fluctuations in the gas price (Mu, 
2007: Hulshof et al., 2016).  
 
Figure 2.3. Monthly production from the Groningen gas field, 
                       January 2011 – November 2017 
Source: Bloomberg 
Looking at the supply side of the market for natural gas, both the 
imports and the production by small fields are relatively flat over time. 
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Both these types of supply contain natural gas with a high calorific value. 
The other two types of supply show large variability over time. These are 
the Groningen field, acting as a swing supplier, and the storages (see 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4). As can be seen, the storages are historically used only 
in times of peak demand. These peak demands are reached on extreme 
cold winter days. Note that these storages are filled up again in summer 
times. Both the gas from the Groningen field and (most of) the storages 
have a low calorific value. These storages are meant to support the 
Groningen gas field to deliver flexibility to the market. The supporting role 
of the storages has increased over time as Groningen is increasingly less 
able to act as swing supplier (see also Hulshof et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 2.4. Daily net injection from storages, January 2011 –  
                       November 2017  
Source: Bloomberg 
Concluding, the different origins of supply serve different end-users. The 
high-calorific gas demand by the industry is supplied by the small-fields 
and imports from countries like Russia and Norway as well as the import 
of LNG. The low-calorific gas demanded by domestic and foreign 
consumers originated from the Groningen field. In summer times, 
storages are filled to meet excessive peak demand in winter periods. Due 
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to the nature of their usage, the high-calorific gas has a rather flat 
production and consumption path, where the low-calorific gas is highly 
volatile.  
 
2.4 Impact of lower production cap on gas market and consumption 
As explained above, the gas-induced earthquakes were the reason for the 
Dutch government to lower the cap on the annual production from 
Groningen. Given the importance of the Groningen field one may expect 
that this policy change has an effect to the gas market. One can argue that 
the limitation of production on Groningen makes the availability of 
natural gas more difficult. This in turn might lead to higher prices for 
natural gas.  
This relation of the limited availability of Groningen gas and the 
natural gas price is investigated by Perey (2018).3 It was found, however, 
that there is no significant evidence of an effect of the lowering of the cap 
on the Dutch gas price (Figure 2.5). This lack of effect on the price can be 
explained by the existence of substitution in supply. In other words, the 
supply of Groningen that is gone due to the lowering of the cap is likely 
replaced by another source.  This mechanism shows the well-functioning 
of the integrated European gas markets. This is in line with earlier findings 
of Kuper et al. (2016) of a more integrated European gas market. 
Because the residential sector depends on L-gas, a reduced 
availability of the Groningen gas implies that H-gas has to be used in 
combination with quality conversion. Quality conversion is the conversion 
of H-gas to L-gas, which is done by adding nitrogen to H-gas to obtain a 
similar level of thermic value as L-gas. The problem with conversion is that 
                                                          
3 The investigation consisted of an empirical analysis of the influence of the lower 
cap on the gas price of the Title Transfer Facility (TTF), a virtual gas trading hub 
in the Netherlands. To be able to identify the sole effect of the production cap, 
control variables were added to the regression. 
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the amount of H-gas converted to L-gas is limited to the maximal output 
of conversion facilities. According to Thackrah (2018), the quality 
conversion facilities already reached their maximum capacity at times in 
December 2017. This was caused by excessive demand, driven by cold 
weather, which could not be met by Groningen production. At the same 
time, around 1 billion cubicle metres (bcm) was withdrawn from the Norg 
storage. 
 
Figure 2.5. Daily gas price at TTF (in €/MWh), 2010-2018 
Note: Bold lines: dates of major earthquakes; dotted lines: dates of government 
announcement of lower production cap.  
Sources: Bloomberg L.P., NAM, EZ 
Given the new cap and announcement of further lowering of that cap, 
it becomes clear that Groningen can no longer serve as a swing supplier. 
To be able to meet the higher demand in times of cold weather, storages 
and quality conversion have to play an increasing role. Since both sources 
are constraint to a maximum, future investments have to be made to take 
over the role of Groningen. Indeed, in the announcement of the end of 
production in Groningen, the government also announced an investment 
of 500 million euro in a new quality conversion station.4  





2.5 Energy transition 
The policy measures to reduce and ultimately stop the gas production 
from Groningen fit within the policy objectives to realize an energy 
transition in which fossil energy is being replaced by renewable energy. 
Reducing the supply of gas from one source (i.e. the Groningen field) does 
in itself, however, not bring this energy transition. As we have seen in the 
previous section, the cap on Groningen has hardly affected the 
international price of gas, which means that the market parties expect that 
the Groningen gas can be easily replaced by gas from other sources 
because of the international integration of gas markets. Therefore, 
measures to reduce the gas consumption are required. The Dutch 
governments wants to reduce the gas use in the residential sector 
(housing) by electrification (e.g. heat pumps) and extending district-heat 
systems. Electrification means that the demand for electricity increases, 
on top of the autonomous increase in electricity demand.  
In a scenario analysis of the Dutch energy system, Moraga and Mulder 
(2018) conclude that the total electricity demand will be 50% higher in 
2050 compared to the current level, which is mainly due to the increased 
demand resulting from electrification of housing and the transport sector. 
Although the supply of renewable energy (in particular wind and solar) 
will increase strongly according to current policy objectives, this increase 
will not be sufficient to displace natural gas from the electricity sector. In 
a scenario where the current gas demand in the residential sector is 
gradually fully replaced by a mixture of electrification and district heating, 
while the transport sector is also almost fully electrified, the domestic 
demand for natural gas remains at about the current levels. In 
combination with the declining supply from both the Groningen gas field 




Figure 2.6. Supply of gas to meet Dutch gas demand, in case of  
                       electrification of heating and transport and strong 
                       increase of renewables, 2016-2050 
Source: Moraga and Mulder (2018) 
Even if the supply of renewable energy were 3 times as large as the 
current policy objectives, the import of natural gas would still be 
significant in the long term in order to meet the demand within the Dutch 
economy (Figure 2.6). In this scenario, the electricity sector would be fully 
based on renewable energy. The total supply of electricity would exceed 
the total demand (on an annual basis) which would make it possible to 
produce synthetic gas for industry usage, though the supply would not be 
sufficient to meet all demand. From this scenario analysis, it appears that 
while the Groningen gas production will stop at some point not far in the 
future, the gas sector will likely remain necessary to supply gas to the 
electricity sector, residential sector and industry in the Dutch economy for 
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3.  The Janus Face of Natural Gas Resources in the  
      Netherlands 
      Bert Scholtens 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter argues that the exploitation of the natural gas field in 
Groningen has both positive and negative effects on the Dutch economy. 
These effects are hard to balance due to their incommensurable nature. 
The chapter reflects on the role of gas in the Dutch economy, discusses the 
economic implications of the exploitation of natural gas as well as the 
externalities, and reflects on the economic impact of phasing out the 
exploitation of the Groningen field.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 goes into gas 
revenues in the Netherlands. Section 3.3 highlights how to assess the 
revenues from natural resources from an economic perspective and 
reflects on the conventional wisdom that abundant natural resources are 
a blessing for society. Section 3.4 discusses key features of the impact of 
reducing the exploitation of gas from the Groningen field. A brief 
conclusion is in 3.5. 
 
3.2 Gas revenues 
The proceeds from natural gas exploitation go into the government budget 
(90%) and to the mining companies (10%). Since its discovery in 1959, the 
Groningen gas field has yielded about 288 billion Euros for the 
government’s finances, whereas the mining companies (ExxonMobil and 
Royal Dutch Shell) earned 29 billion Euros (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2014; 
CBS, 2017). Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the nominal revenues and 
the role of these revenues in the government budget. In most years, gas 
revenues made up between 3 and 6% of the government’s revenues. 
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Especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the contribution of gas to the 
government budget was relatively high. At that time, the gas revenues 
were a very welcome source of expenditure for the respective Dutch 
governments. Due to falling prices and societal pressure to reduce the 
exploitation, the contribution in the last few years has been low from an 
historical perspective.  
Figure 3.1. Total natural gas revenues for Dutch state and its  
        share in the total government revenues per year 
Source: CBS 
One needs to realize that it is both the volume of gas exploited and the 
international gas prices that make up the revenues. According to the Dutch 
Committee on Safety (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2015), the desire 
to maximize gas revenues drives the former. In the early 1960s, there was 
great anxiety with the government that nuclear power would become the 
main energy source and would impair the value of the gas reserves. Hence, 
they set up long-term contracts to fix the export of gas. The gas prices 
relate to developments in international gas and oil markets, which have 




Figure 3.2. Natural gas price at Henry Hub and Brent oil price,  
                      January 2000 – March 2018  
Source: Bloomberg 
As to the externalities of the exploitation of natural gas, it is important 
to realize that the main agents (See Box 3.1) were fully informed about 
these but did not engage with either mitigation or adaptation (Malm, 
2016; Supron and Oreskes, 2017). Further, the first earthquakes in 
relation to the exploitation of natural gas were already occurring in the 
1960s and brought to the attention of the authorities (Van der Sluis, 1989; 
Reijnders and Van der Sluis, 1997). These externalities were left unpriced 
and hence did not influence the revenues until the 21st century. 
The exploration and exploitation of gas is capital intense, but 
operational costs are quite limited. Gas exploration and exploitation 
currently involves about 7000 jobs (<0.1% of total employment). The 
Netherlands exports the majority of its gas. The gas reserves from the 
Groningen field will run out in 2030. The estimated value of the current 
(remaining) gas reserves is about 100 billion euros (Algemene 
Rekenkamer, 2014; CBS, 2017). Hence, overall, the gas resources could 
yield revenues of 400 billion Euros for the Dutch government. Figure 3.3 
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and Box 3.1 show the governance structure of gas exploitation in the 
Netherlands. 
 
Figure 3.3. Organisation of the Dutch natural gas system 
 
Source: updated version of Mulder and Zwart (2006) 
The gas revenues fund the general government’s expenses and 
support the Dutch welfare system. During a 17-year period, part of the gas 
revenues funded specific projects that aimed at improving the economic 
structure. These projects previously had been on the regular government 
budget. In total, these projects amounted to € 17 billion of investments. 
Examples are a high-speed railway track between Amsterdam and the 
Belgian border, the extension of the Rotterdam harbour, a freight-carrier 
railway track to the German border, and applied scientific research. 
Although an ex ante cost-benefit analysis was being used (Mulder and 
Zwart, 2006), there was no systematic reporting about the economic 
impact of these projects, and there is no proof they actually improved the 
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economic structure and earning capacity. The investments did not occur 
in the region were the exploitation of gas was located; less than 1% of the 
investments materialized there, which was generally perceived as unfair 
(IOO, 2006).  
 
Box 3.1: Governance of Dutch natural gas system 
The Dutch government participates in gas mining activities via its fully 
owned company Energie Beheer Nederland (EBN). Together with the 
Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell and 
ExxonMobil), it has set up the Maatschap Groningen to manage the 
exploitation of the Groningen field. The Maatschap Groningen sells to 
GasTerra, which is a joint venture of EBN, the Dutch State, Royal Dutch 
Shell and ExxonMobil. Gasunie is responsible for transport and fully 
owned by the Dutch State.  
The Maatschap Groningen does not need to register with the Chamber of 
Commerce, and does not need to disclose its operations and organization. 
Officially, the concession for exploitation is exclusively to NAM. However, 
in a side-letter it reads that the concession to Maatschap Groningen is a 
limited company with two shareholders (the Dutch State and NAM). 
Appendix 3.A shows this letter (in Dutch). The side-letter may become 
crucial in the debate about the role of the Dutch State in the settlement of 
the claims regarding the impact of the exploitation of gas on climatic 
changes and of the earthquake damage and as such may have an impact 
on the gas revenues as it reveals that the State is a shareholder and is 
committed to the exploitation.  
 
Alternatively, one might want to investigate the international impact 
of investments in Dutch gas infrastructure (Bouwmeester and Scholtens, 
2017). To this extent, they estimated the cost-side impact of investments 
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in gas transmission by quantifying the direct and indirect, national and 
international impacts based on a multi-regional input-output model. They 
estimated the value of investment projects included in the EU’s Ten Year 
Network Development Plans. The overall budgets for these plans translate 
into gross fixed capital formation by the industries that manufacture the 
pipelines, compressor station elements, storage facilities, and 
interconnectors. It appears that two-thirds of employment compensation 
and four-fifths of the gross operating surplus of gas projects in the 
Netherlands lands abroad (Bouwmeester and Scholtens, 2017, p.376). 
This clearly shows the openness of the Dutch economy. 
The gas revenues make up part of the central government’s revenues 
and as such contribute to general government spending. Most of it 
supported the design and maintenance of the social welfare system, the 
health system, and the education system. This has been helpful for the 
social and economic development of the Netherlands. However, we lack a 
proper metric to assess the use of the gas revenues, especially in relation 
to externalities such as climate change and earthquakes.  
 
3.2 How to assess resource use? 
A conventional approach to assess the use of revenues from natural 
resources is the Hartwick (1977) rule (see also Asheim et al., 2003). This 
rule holds that countries need to invest the proceeds from their natural 
resources in reproducible capital that yields enough to keep per capita 
wealth intact. Of course, in practice, it is hard to specify which part of 
natural resources revenues should be invested in which type of capital. 
Important is to realize though that from an economic point of view the 
investments should allow for the sustainability of the aggregated stock of 
capital. Future generations are entitled to at least the same stock of capital 
as current ones. In the case of the natural gas resources, one might 
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imagine that part of the funds are used to allow for the development of 
alternative sources of energy generation. There is no compelling evidence 
that the consecutive Dutch cabinets explicitly accounted for this 
intergenerational perspective when they decided about spending the 
proceeds.  
Until the 1990s, natural resources usually were regarded as a blessing 
for the domestic economy. The rents would accrue to the Dutch State, 
which would have additional financial resources that could help 
strengthen the country’s economic structure. However, the new economic 
growth theory and the accompanying empirical research came up with a 
very different perspective. Sachs and Warner (1997) established that 
countries highly reliant on primary exports did underperform in relation 
to countries that relied less on natural resources. This finding appeared to 
be robust after controlling for various factors, such as initial GNP, 
openness, legal system, institutions, endowment of all kinds of capital, 
price shocks, etc. (Gylfason, 2001; Mehlum et al., 2006). Please realize 
that there are contrasting views (see Alexeev et al., 2009), and that the 
heterogeneity between countries and natural resources is substantial 
(Torvik, 2009). This means that it is not possible to arrive at general 
statements about the exact impact of the availability of particular natural 
resources on wealth in a specific country. Therefore, it seems relevant to 
have a closer look at the transmission mechanisms that might be at work 
regarding the impact of resource endowment on economic performance. 
Several factors might play a role regarding the impact of resource 
abundance on economic development. The most famous one probably is 
the Dutch disease. The Economist coined this qualification to describe the 
effect of gas revenues on the Dutch economy. It relates to the effect of an 
increase in export revenues of a natural resource on the exchange rate. 
This might result in a real appreciation of the exchange rate. Appreciation 
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implies that the exports become relative expensive and therefore less 
attractive for international markets. This has a negative impact on the 
competitive position of those industries that are not highly reliant on the 
abundant natural resource. Consequently, there is a (relative) reduction in 
the role of the industry in the economy and there will be less economic 
diversification (Sachs and Warner, 1995). In the Netherlands during the 
1970s, the high revenue generated by the natural gas discovery led to a 
sharp decline in the competitiveness of its other, non-booming tradable 
sector (Corden, 1984). Despite the revenue windfall, the Netherlands 
experienced a drastic relative decline in economic growth. When the 
Netherlands swapped the national currency for the Euro, the impact of the 
Dutch disease watered down considerably. When gas revenues make up a 
smaller part of total revenues, this of course too has a dampening effect. 
Other adverse factors that play a role in the relationship between 
natural resources and the economy are price volatility, education and 
research, and rent-seeking. Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) show 
that the volatility of oil prices, which usually anchored natural gas prices 
until a couple of years ago, has a negative impact on growth. Revenues 
fluctuate and this makes it difficult to project the returns on investments 
within the economy. Further, Gylfason (2001) highlights that in resource-
rich countries, the opportunity costs to accumulating human capital are 
very high. Due to myopic policies, there is too little investment in human 
capital. This too depresses the growth potential. A fourth factor is rent-
seeking. The existence of natural resources attracts firms and institutions 
that try to benefit from their abundance. They tend to focus more on 
keeping a privileged position than on productive activities. Such rent-
seeking is reflected in lobbying and results in suboptimal government 
spending (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 1997).  
33 
 
It is not possible to pinpoint at a detailed and exact level how each of 
these factors has affected the Dutch economy in relation to its natural gas 
resources. They highlight that next to benefits from the presence of these 
resources, there also is a cost. This also signals that the use of the revenues 
might have been not highly efficient and that the behavioural changes that 
resulted from having the gas may have led to a welfare loss. These effects 
occur next to the negative externalities of exploiting fossil resources. The 
greenhouse gas emissions from using natural gas contribute to the 
concentration of these gases in the atmosphere and, as such, to climate 
change. The fossil mining companies have been staunch supporters of 
denying any such relationship (see Supron and Oreskes, 2017), and most 
Dutch consumers have been keen to use their services. The increasing 
damage of the earthquakes resulting from the mining of gas in the 
northern regions of the Netherlands also adds to the costs of natural 
resources. Until recently, ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch qualified 
allegations of the earthquakes resulting from mining gas as ‘nonsense’ 
(van der Sluis, 1989; Reijnders and Van der Sluis, 1997). This showed that 
next to the positive side (the revenues), the exploitation of the gas 
resources also had a negative side (growth distortion and externalities. 
Maximizing the exploitation is in the interest of the government (on 
behalf of society as a whole) and the mining companies, but also has the 
largest negative impact on the communities living in the areas where the 
gas is exploited. Thus, there is a conflict. How much and how fast should 
gas fields be exploited? From a pure economic point of view, according to 
the Hotelling rule, one should decide this based by comparing the returns 
from the risk-free investment of the net revenues (i.e. revenues after 
deducting the exploration, development and exploitation costs, and the 
compensation of the negative externalities) and the result of non-mining 
the natural resource. If fuels become scarcer, it might be attractive to 
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postpone gas mining, as the future prices may be even higher. The same 
holds if the negative externalities increase. Further, in a situation of 
almost zero or even negative interest rates, it is attractive to postpone 
mining. There is no evidence that government and mining companies 
accounted for these considerations when making decisions to mine the gas 
and to maximize the revenues from exploitation (Algemene Rekenkamer, 
2014; Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2015). 
 
3.3 Impact of reducing gas exploitation 
In March 2018, the Dutch government announced that the exploitation of 
the Groningen gas field will be gradually phased out and should end in 
2030. Details are not available yet, but the expectation is that the revenues 
may be halved (i.e., be 50 billion Euros). It is not clear how this phasing 
out relates to the already foreseen end of the exploitation of the field. 
Would slowing down the exploitation of gas affect the future wealth of the 
Netherlands? This is not very likely as the exhaustion of the Groningen 
field is well-known and any gas remaining in the gas fields is an asset. 
Reducing the speed of exploitation implies that revenues will be lower 
now, but they may be higher in the future, given the price of natural gas 
and the volume that can be safely mined. Implicitly, the government 
seems to have made a trade-off between maximizing the revenues from 
exploitation and facing the increasing burden of climate change and 
earthquake claims.  
An issue might be that the partners in the exploitation of the 
Groningen gas field, i.e. ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch Shell, put a claim 
with the Dutch government due to income lost. However, this is unlikely, 
as the contract reads that both the commercial parties and the government 
are in it together (see Appendix 3.A). The government will ‘lose out’ much 
more than the two companies, as it gains much more from exploitation 
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than the commercial parties. Further, all three are liable for the repairs 
(and probably compensation) of the damage done and any damages that 
might occur in the future. Both the tapering off of the exploitation of the 
Groningen field as well as the increasing costs regarding the reparations 
from earthquake damage will have a negative impact on the Dutch 
government budget. In part, this was already projected in the past. But 
what differs is that the speed of the tapering is higher, as are the reparation 
costs.  
The negative externalities from exploiting the gas fields (i.e. higher 
probability of flooding, lowering of the underground, earthquakes) require 
adaptation and mitigation and, hence, expenditures. Here, it is quite 
straightforward that this will reduce the revenues from owning the gas 
resource as this is the cause of the negative externalities and the 
government is committed to its exploitation (see Appendix 3.A). For the 
mining companies, it might translate in the stranding of part of their 
assets.5 Stranded assets are investments that have already been made but 
which, at some time prior to the end of their economic life (as assumed at 
the investment decision point), are no longer able to earn an economic 
return. The extent of strandedness of the gas reserves relates to the advent 
of new technologies and/or regulation (see also Van der Ploeg and 
Withagen, 2015). In this respect, it is frequently mentioned that it would 
have been welcome to set aside part of the gas revenues (as in the case of 
Norway). Nevertheless, the problems regarding fiscal policy and the 
strandedness of assets could have been substantially mitigated in case the 
externalities had been properly accounted for. From an economic point of 
view, this is the first best solution. 
                                                          




In all, it should be clear that phasing out the exploitation of the 
Groningen gas field will reduce government revenues. The expected 
revenues (of about 50 billion euros) should be able to compensate for the 
costs in relation to earthquake damage in the region. Here, one needs to 
keep in mind that the effects of mining for gas are likely to have an impact 
on the underground that will last for at least several decades (Bourne et 
al., 2014). What is ‘left’ after the reparations of the earthquake damage, 
could be considered to help support the transformation of the energy 
system. In the future energy system, electricity is supposed to come to play 
a far more dominant role. This may diminish the influence of the fossil fuel 
trade, reduce the choke points that have made fossils a source of global 
tension, put energy production into local hands and make power more 
accessible to the poor. It will also make the world cleaner and safer. 
However, the transition process is unlikely to be very smooth, given the 
vested interests and the costs of transiting to a new energy system. Hence, 
it is clear that the energy system will remain to have an effect on the 
government budget.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
I studied the economics of the revenues of natural gas resources in the 
Netherlands. These revenues show to have a Janus face. So far, the 
Groningen gas field has yielded almost 290 billion Euros in government 
revenues. However, the Dutch policy of maximizing revenues from the 
exploitation of the gas fields paid insufficient attention to negative 
externalities. More specifically, appropriate performance and risk 
assessment and management never were in place regarding social and 
environmental externalities. As a result, there are ‘nasty surprises’ for all 
stakeholders, namely earthquake damage, environmental pollution, loss 
of business, loss of income, and stranded assets. The Groningen gas field 
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will remain to play a role in Dutch government revenues, even when the 
exploitation is phased out. In the past 60 years, it was a profit center, but 
the realization of the externalities has turned it into a cost center, which is 
probably here to stay for several decades.  
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4. Taking it home: impact of earthquakes on the regional  
     housing market   
     George de Kam 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The strongest seismic activity caused by gas extraction is observed in the 
rural part of the province of Groningen, which is located in the Northern 
periphery of the Netherlands. Light earthquakes and damages to 
buildings, however, have also been felt in the provincial capital city of 
Groningen. Until now, 170.000 persons have been confronted with 
damage, half of them twice or more times (Postmes, Stroebe et al., 2018). 
Two-third of the province’s housing stock is located in areas where 
damages have been reported (De Kam, 2016). In the area with the highest 
seismic risk, 22.000 houses will have to be checked for their compliance 
with ‘near collapse’ building standards. 
Housing is probably the most important linkage between seismic 
activity caused by gas extraction and the daily life of people living on top 
of the gas field. Because of the stress caused by damage to properties and 
perceived seismic risk, an increasing number of people want to move out 
of the affected area. At the same time, less people want to move in. Both 
processes have a negative effect on the housing market. In recent years 
several policy measures have been implemented to compensate and to 
mitigate the earthquake impacts on housing. In spite of these measures 
evidence shows that the housing market is struggling, and that the 
(perceived risk of) earthquakes does have a negative effect on transaction 
prices in the affected area. This chapter gives an overview of the effect of 
the earthquake risks on the regional housing market. We conclude with 
some suggestions for policy measures that can improve the functioning of 
the regional housing market. 
42 
 
4.2. Housing stress caused by earthquakes 
For many people in the area, the impact on their housing situation is the 
most direct confrontation with the negative consequences of the mining 
activities, and due to various causes on which we will elaborate further on, 
it has developed into an open nerve. Housing is associated with a wide 
array of material and immaterial values, beliefs and emotions. It offers 
shelter and safety, and a private territory. Decent and undisturbed 
housing conditions add to the feeling of being in control of one’s life 
(Christie, Smith et al., 2008). For home-owners, property rights in 
housing are generally perceived as a pathway to accumulation of wealth 
(Di, Belsky et al., 2007). Many people improve their housing conditions by 
sweat equity (Gyourko and Saiz, 2004), and are proud of their houses 
(Saunders, 1990). 
People who are dissatisfied with their present housing situation will 
try to move house. The reasons for relocation can be classified either as 
the wish for adjustment (of the house, neighborhood, or 
accessibility/distance to the workplace) or as induced by changes in 
employment or events in the life cycle (Pacione, 2005). The success of 
moving depends on many factors. Suitable vacant houses must be 
available, and in the case of home owners (about 60%, up to a 100% in 
small rural communities in Groningen), at a price the household can 
afford and finance. Prospective tenants will have to be able to pay 
commercial rents in the private sector, or to comply with rules of 
allocation in the social rented sector. 
For an analysis of the impact of induced seismicity on moving house in 
Groningen, stress based models of the relocation process are suitable, 
because these explicitly take account of negative environmental conditions 
(Pacione, 2005; Brown and Moore, 1970). A simplified version of such a 
model is presented in Figure 4.1. Internal or external forces may reduce 
43 
 
place utility for a specific household. Mediated by personal characteristics, 
this reduced utility can cause stress. Some households (have to) cope with 
this stress and remain where they live, but others decide to relocate. In the 
latter case, this starts a process of matching aspirations with available 
vacancies. The model describes three possible outcomes: 
A. the need to adjust aspirations and restart the searching process 
because no match could be made; 
B. the decision to give up searching and remain in the present house;  
C. the decision to relocate by buying or renting a new house. 
Needless to say that the decision to give up and remain, or to adjust 
aspirations may well add up to the stress that feeds the intention to move.  
Figure 4.1. Stress model of housing relocation  
 
Source: Reworked from Brown and Moore (1970) in Pacione (2005, p 206)  
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For Groningen, the impact of induced earthquakes is a location-
specific external force. All in all, for a number of residents the large scale 
gas extraction in Groningen has gradually eroded – and sometimes shock-
wise shattered – their housing-related wellbeing. In the worst cases, they 
have to leave their home for safety reasons. Others feel trapped in their 
once cherished properties that no one wants to take the risk of buying. 
 
4.3. Impact of earthquakes on the housing stock 
The province of Groningen includes about a quarter of a million of houses, 
of which 54% is occupied by the owner. The share of owner-occupied 
houses is much higher among the group of houses which are strongly 
impacted by the earthquakes (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1. Composition of the housing stock in Groningen and  
                    impact of earthquakes 
 




































276.000 219.800 21.800 27.000 7.400 
Owner 
occupied 





26% 27% n.a. n.a 42%6 
Detached 
housing 7 
n.a n.a 28% 42% 76% 
n.a.: not available 
Sources: Hoekstra et al (2016); Boelhouwer et al (2016), de Kam (2016) 
                                                          
6 Percentage for municipality of Loppersum. 




In a large part of the regional housing stock the induced seismicity has 
caused damage, which often manifests itself in cracks in walls or other 
parts of the structure. Also the integrity of the building as a whole or its 
foundations may be endangered. Until now no buildings have collapsed 
because of the earthquakes, but 147 properties have been classified as 
acutely unsafe buildings (NCG, 2017), and another 95 have already been 
demolished.8  
Figure 4.2. Expected peak ground acceleration and level of  
                      damage claims in the province of Groningen 
Source: National Coordinator Groningen 
 
The spatial distribution of affected houses is strongly related to the spatial 
dimension of the earthquakes. In Figure 4.2, the curved lines show the 
expected peak ground acceleration across the area, based upon a seismic 
                                                          
8 Retrieved from http://database.hetverdwenengroningen.nl/ on March 29 2018. 
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model and the pattern of observed earthquakes, as well as the spatial 
distribution of various intensities of damage claims that have been 
reported. 
A review of the cumulative percentage of reported damages (specified 
by time and municipality) is presented in Figure 4.3. Obviously, the core 
municipality of Loppersum got a large number of damage claims 
immediately after the 2012 earthquake of Huizinge, which is a hamlet in 
Loppersum. In Slochteren the number of damage claims only started to 
rise more than a year later, illustrating the spatio-temporal change in the 
pattern of earthquakes. 
 
Figure 4.3. Cumulative percentage of damage claims for a    
                       selection of municipalities in the Province of  





4.4 Different effects for home-owners and tenants 
The shock of having damage to one’s own house and the efforts that are 
needed to have that damage compensated have a negative effect on  the 
wellbeing of many people living in the area9. On top of that, seeing other 
damaged properties, communication in personal networks, media 
attention and uncertainty about the future with regard to gas extraction 
and the risk of new earthquakes also contribute to a negative image of the 
region. This has consequences for the performance of the regional housing 
market as personal experience and images of the region all add up to 
potential mover’s information about vacancies, and are well taken in mind 
when vacancies are inspected (de Kam and Mey, 2017). 
Both the ‘earthquake track-record’ of an individual property and the 
earthquake-related image of the location of the house are determinants of 
the behavior of its residents and its potential buyers or tenants in the 
housing market. But - although they may live next-door and may even 
have the same amount of damage -, the impact of earthquakes is different 
for home owners and tenants (Raemaekers, 2009; Hoekstra et al., 2016; 
Postmes et al., 2018). This is because tenants are not responsible for the 
structural repairs and physical condition of their houses10, and because 
they do not experience the consequences of earthquakes for the value of 
their house. Of course, housing associations (being the principal landlords 
in the area) do experience the impact of earthquakes on the direct as well 
as the indirect returns of their rented stock, and they have recently had 
their claim for compensation of this damage rewarded in court. On the 
other hand, there are some signs that the perceived risk of home 
                                                          
9 For more detail on this, see chapter 5 of this publication, Perlaviciute (2017). 
10  An internal survey by housing associations shows that tenants appear to be less 
active in reporting damages then home owners. In all areas with reported 
damages up to July 2015, 7 percent of the properties of housing associations have 
reported damage, against 20 percent in the other properties. 
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ownership may result in a stronger preference for rented 
accommodation.11 
 
4.5 Earthquakes and the decision to move into the area of risk 
Tenure related differences in the perception of earthquake impacts are 
also reflected in the pattern of immigration to the area. After the 2012 
earthquake, many home owners have observed a decrease of interest of 
prospective buyers from outside the area (De Kam and Idsardi, 2014; de 
Kam and Raemaekers, 2014; De Kam and Mey, 2017). This is confirmed 
by surveys at low spatial scale. In the municipality of Eemsmond, a large 
proportion of low income tenants in the immigration was reported, 
whereas Boes (2016), in his survey of households that recently bought a 
home in Loppersum, found that the proportion of people from outside did 
go down, and that the influx is dominated by middle-income single 
households12. Grounded in micro-data analysis, Hoekstra et al. (2016) 
show that the total amount of incoming households has not diminished 
substantially, but we see less long distance movers. Also the share of single 
households and lower income groups in immigration from outside the 
area has gone up in the period 2013-2014, following the 2012 earthquake. 
The tentative conclusion is that the earthquakes contribute to a lower 
level of immigration to the area, while the composition of the immigration 
changes towards tenants and lower income groups. 
 
4.6 Earthquakes and the decision to leave the area of risk 
The flipside of the coin is people wanting to leave the area because of the 
earthquake risk. A year after the earthquake of Huizinge, 30% of the 
                                                          
11 See Raemaekers (2009, 2014), and Hoekstra et al. (2016). 
12 Of the buyers of properties in the municipality of Loppersum between 2009 and 
April 2016, only 25 out of 391 buyers moved from outside the region, but 20 of 
them moved before 2012, only 5 after the heavy earthquake of august 201212. 
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persons who had their house for sale in locations within 10 km distance 
from the epicenter explicitly mentioned the earthquakes as the reason to 
move out of the area. In a larger sample of a provincial panel survey in 
2014, 6% said that they would leave the risk area. Interestingly, in a 
nation-wide panel survey in 2015 23% said that if they lived in an area with 
earthquake risk they would try to move house as soon as possible. 
Obviously, responses differ for reasons such as the exact phrasing of 
survey questions, the personal experience with and attitude towards 
earthquakes, and the perception of the size of the risk area.  
It is important to note that about half of the municipalities in the 
earthquake area did already experience a decline in population size 
because of their peripheral location and low levels of jobs and amenities. 
Apparently, the effects of earthquake risks and low attractiveness of local 
communities because of (other) factors that underpin population decline 
mutually reinforce each other. This is illustrated by Hoekstra et al (2016) 
showing that in the nine municipalities at the core of the impact area, only 
27%13 of households that consider moving want to stay in their own 
municipality, while the national average on this variable is well over 60%. 
The wish to leave the area is stronger with owners than with tenants. 
Figures show that for most people the intention or urge to move out of the 
risk area does not yet seem to have materialized in a major exodus. The 
number of moves out of the most affected area, however, is rising 
(Boumeester and Lamain, 2016). Jansen et al. (2017) found that the effect 
of earthquakes on the intention to move is mediated by psychological 
distress (anxiety, insecurity and concern). The authors conclude that the 
way in which residents handle the earthquake experience determines their 
intention to move, not the experience in itself. This provides opportunities 
                                                          




to prevent out-migration by supporting residents and by providing them 
psychological care and security regarding the market value of their 
dwellings. 
 
4.6 The effects of earthquake impacts on the housing market 
Damage to properties and the perceived risk of earthquakes are an 
incentive for people to leave the area, and at the same time they reduce its 
attractiveness for new residents. These negative tendencies have various 
effects in the housing market.  
The basic effect is a lower demand for housing, resulting in longer time 
on the market. Sometimes properties do not sell at all. This leads to a 
reduction of list prices, and to lower transaction prices (Raemaekers, 
2013; De Kam and Raemaekers, 2014; Hoekstra et al., 2016; Atlas voor 
gemeenten, 2017; Elhorst and Duran, 2018). Lower transaction prices 
contribute to a loss of property values. This may result in a higher loan to 
value ratio, and subsequent problems related to mortgages, such as a risk 
premium on interest rates, or the refusal of additional finance (De Kam et 
al., 2018) 
Because property values are at risk, owners are less willing to invest in 
maintenance or renewal of their properties (Hoekstra et al., 2016; De Kam 
and Raemaekers, 2014). On the other hand, compensating measures do 
recover some of the value losses (Atlas voor gemeenten, 2017), also 
because owners make additional investments at their own expense when 
repairs paid by NAM are executed (De Kam and Mey, 2017). 
The level of the negative price effect of the induced seismicity in 
Groningen has been estimated with various hedonic price models. The 
assumption in hedonic models is that all properties of a house are valued 
at a specific price. So when prices of houses with similar properties are 
compared, of which one is affected by earthquakes and the other is not, 
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the price difference is assumed to reflect the willingness to pay (less) for 
houses with earthquake risk. 
The current set of hedonic models all produce different price effects. 
This is due to different assumptions on the area and the time-span over 
which effects are expected. One of the disputed issues is the way 
earthquake impacts should be measured. For these reasons, an exact 
comparison of the outcome of the price models is not possible. In a review 
by the end of 2016, the average negative price effect since the 2012 
earthquake across the affected area has been estimated in the range 
between 2 and 4 percent (Derksen, 2017). But a recently developed model 
by Elhorst and Duran (2018, forthcoming) dates the first price effect back 
in 2007 in the most heavily affected area, with price effects spreading 
across the whole of the province in later years. Several models show a 
decreasing price effect after the shock in the first years after the 2012 
earthquake (Atlas voor gemeenten, 2017). The general assumption is that 
this is (at least partly) due to the cap on gas production, a slightly reduced 
seismic activity in that period, and the measures that have been taken to 
compensate property owners. 
 
4.7 Policy measures related to housing: way forward? 
In the wake of the 2012 earthquake, various policy measures have been 
implemented for compensating and mitigating the effects of earthquakes 
on the housing stock. As Table 2 shows, most of these measures are 
financed by NAM, because of its liability for any damage caused by its 
mining activities.14 In total approximately 1.5 billion Euros have been 
spent.  
  
                                                          
14 See chapter 2 in this publication: Mulder and Perey (2018).  
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Table 4.2. Measures for compensation and mitigation of  
                     earthquake impacts on housing 
Measure Since Financed 
by 
Estimated # claims and budget 
Compensation for 
damage repair to  
1996 NAM 36%, 
State 64%15 
 




2015 3.217 properties inspected, 571 
properties reinforced  
Buy out of severely 
damaged properties 
2012 NAM 74 houses, 15 demolished; value 15 
million euros18  
Compensation for 
value losses  
April 
2014 
NAM 2.175 properties, 12 million euros19 
Subsidy (1st round) for 
improvement  
2014 State 4.000 euro per house. Budget spent 
is 125 million euros 
Idem 2nd round 2016  State 714 units, 2.8 million euro (NCG, 
2017)20 
Buy-out of hard to sell 
properties (1st pilot) 
2016 NAM 42 properties,,(revolving) budget of 
10 million euros (NCG, 2017) 
Buy-out scheme 
(follow-up) 
2018 NAM 30 million for 2018-2020 
Sources: NCG, NAM 
                                                          
15 Retrieved from https://www.nu.nl/gaswinning-
groningen/5089997/nederlandse-staat-betaalt-grootste-deel-van-
aardbevingsschade-groningen.html on March 12 2018 
16 Until June  2017  
17 Until October 2017 
18 Estimated value own calculation at 200.000 euro per unit 
19 86% of 2.529 requests have been agreed by NAM, average compensation 
between 1.1% and 4.7% (lowest and highest 15% of observations excluded). 
Estimate of total compensation 2.175 units*2.9%* 190.000 = 11,984,250 euros. 
Data Retrieved from: https://www.nam.nl/feiten-en-cijfers/voortgang-
waarderegeling.html#iframe=L2VtYmVkL2NvbXBvbmVudC8/aWQ9d2FhcmRlc
mVnZWxpbmc=(Retrieved 12 March 2018) 
20 The total budget for the second round is 89 million euros .ref 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2016/12/06/invulling-
nieuwe-waardevermeerderingsregeling-groningen. (Retrieved 13 March 2018) 
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Until the present day, however, the compensation and mitigating 
measures have not resulted in restoring a ‘shake-free’ price level in the 
regional housing market. In the long term, the decision to put an end to 
gas extraction will take away the cause of induced seismicity. In the short 
term, however, relatively strong earthquakes like the recent one of the 8th 
of January 2018 are expected to occur every three or four years. The 
decision of the Dutch government to take over responsibility for the 
handling of damage claims and reinforcement is generally welcomed as a 
positive step, but the material and financial consequences for owners of 
real estate have not yet been elaborated. Another unknown factor is the 
price effect of the large scale structural reinforcement scheme that is 
meant to pick up speed in the near future.  
What we do know is that policy changes and proper measures are 
highly relevant for people’s behaviour in the housing market. For example, 
Jansen et al (2017) concluded that because the intention to move from the 
area is mediated by psychological distress, the provision of psychological 
care and security with regard to the value and saleability of their 
properties could reduce their intention to move. The overarching focus of 
policy measures should be to put people back in control of their housing 
situation. To achieve that, the material and financial content of measures 
have to go hand in hand with a participative style of governing the 
implementation of these measures. A fair, generous and transparent 
procedure for assessment and compensation of damages, should be 
offered with free choice of contractors, enabling inhabitants to choose for 
local procurement. 
Moreover, the public body that is in charge of structural reinforcement 
of properties should switch from its present rather technocratic style of 
operating to a really bottom-up approach, taking full account of individual 
arguments for wanting to move house. This would include the offer of a 
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quick scan of the need of structural reinforcement and the allocation of a 
corresponding budget to any owner who would want to put his house for 
sale. This would enable potential buyers to take this essential information 
about the condition of the property into account in their decision to buy 
and refurbish the house. That would result in higher numbers of houses 
sold and reinforced, at much lower transaction costs than the current top 
down policies.  
Finally, all measures targeted at individual properties should be 
embedded in local socio-spatial plans which present a vision for the future 
of communities, and a frame for accommodating high quality 
reinforcement or rebuilding of houses – sometimes accounting for a 
decline in population by taking out low quality housing stock - , with 
respect for heritage, cultural identity and sustainability issues. Such a 
package can restore trust in the functioning of the housing market, and 
sustain or even enhance the possibilities to enjoy the residential qualities 
of the region. 
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5. Public risk perceptions and emotions towards the  
     earthquakes caused by gas production  
     Goda Perlaviciute 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The strongest earthquake so far in the province of Groningen – the 
Huizinge earthquake in 2012 (3.6 on the Richter’s scale) – fuelled public 
debate about gas production and the induced earthquakes. The media 
images suggest that people in the province of Groningen perceive various 
high risks from the earthquakes, including health hazards and risks to 
properties, and that people experience strong negative emotions towards 
the earthquakes, such as anxiety, fear, insecurity, and anger (Van der 
Voort & Vanclay, 2015). Media have played an important role in getting 
more attention to the earthquakes in Groningen from the general public 
as well as policy makers (Kester, 2017).  
Yet, the question remains how accurately media images represent risk 
perceptions and emotions of the general population in the province of 
Groningen. Media tend to focus on “scarce stories” and are most likely to 
capture views of people exposed to highest risks (Breakwell & Barnett, 
2001). People who are most concerned about certain types of energy 
production are most likely to act, for example to protest or attend public 
meetings (De Groot & Steg, 2010), and hence are more likely to appear in 
the media. This could possibly disguise the views of other groups in society 
that are less willing or able to express their views publicly, resulting in a 
limited picture of public risk perceptions and emotions. In order to take 
responsible decisions about gas production in Groningen and to prevent 
its negative social impacts, it is important to have a more comprehensive 
understanding of how people in the province of Groningen perceive the 
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risks of gas production, what emotions they experience, and which 
mitigation measures they demand and prefer.  
To answer these questions, we conducted a longitudinal 
questionnaire study with a representative sample of the population in the 
province of Groningen (Perlaviciute, Steg, Hoekstra, & Vrieling, 2017). We 
included three regions varying in the level of exposure to earthquakes:  
 Most affected region: municipality of Loppersum;  
 Less affected region: municipalities of Bedum, Appingedam, and 
Slochteren;  
 Least affected region: municipalities of Zuidhorn, Groningen, and 
Delfzijl.  
 
The first research phase took place in November 2013, about a year after 
the Huizinge earthquake. The second research phase took place in June 
2014, shortly after a package with mitigation measures was introduced. 
The relevant mitigation measures included the decision to reduce gas 
production in the municipality of Loppersum, measures to reinforce 
houses and compensate people for damage and drop in house values, and 
measures to improve quality of life in the region (e.g. fast internet, 
renewable energy developments). The third research phase took place 
about half a year later, in November 2014. Throughout the course of the 
study, there was increased media and public attention to gas production 
and the induced earthquakes in the province of Groningen21. 
 
  
                                                          
21 For further details about the study and a more detailed specification of the 
findings, please refer to Perlaviciute, Steg, Hoekstra, & Vrieling, 2017. 
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5.2 Acceptability of gas production 
We asked people in the province of Groningen to what extent they think 
that gas production should stop or stay the same (Figure 5.1). The results 
suggest that people think that gas production should be reduced, 
especially in regions that are more exposed to the earthquakes. On 
average, over time people thought more that gas production should stop.  
 
Figure 5.1. Average values of the extent to which people think  
                      gas production should stop (1) or stay the same (7) in  
                      the three regions and across the three study phases 
 
Source: Based on Perlaviciute et al. (2017)22 
 
5.3 Perceptions of risks of earthquakes 
People in the province of Groningen perceived primarily the risks for 
properties as high, namely damages to houses and drop in house values. 
Perceived risks of physical injury, stress and worry, and reduced quality of 
                                                          
22 For further details, see Perlaviciute et al. (2017) 
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living were relatively lower. People in more affected regions evaluated all 
these risks for them as higher than people in less affected regions. Yet, in 
all regions people perceived high risks for the image of the province of 
Groningen. We asked not only how people perceive the risks for 
themselves, but also for other people in the province of Groningen. 
Irrespective of the region they live in, on average people perceived high 
risks of earthquakes for inhabitants of the province of Groningen. For 
people living in less affected regions this resulted in higher perceived risks 
for others than for themselves. Finally, people perceived moderate risks of 
damage to nature and the environment and relatively low risks of impaired 
relationship between people in their neighbourhood because of the 
earthquakes. Notably, perceived risks did not decrease over time; if 
anything, they increased.  
The findings on risk perceptions add some nuance to the media 
images. They reveal that people do not perceive all the risks the same – 
they see some risks, particularly for properties and for the image of the 
province of Groningen, as more likely than others. Other research in the 
province of Groningen has shown that the more damages people have 
faced from earthquakes, the less safe they feel in their home in relation to 
gas production (Sociaal Planbureau Groningen, 2014a; Postmes et al., 
2017). Looking at risk perceptions could help explain these findings; for 
example, people may feel unsafe if they consider it highly likely that the 
earthquakes may damage their home. Future research could look at the 
relationship between risk perceptions and other impacts such as the 
feeling of safety or quality of life in general. While the perceived risks of 
physical injury, stress and worry, and quality of living were relatively 
lower, they were still higher in regions more affected by the earthquakes. 
Other research in the province of Groningen finds that people with more 
exposure to damages form the earthquakes in Groningen report poorer 
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health than people with less exposure to damages (Postmes et al., 2017). 
We did not find a reduction in perceived risks over time. This may be due 
to several factors, including ongoing earthquakes, media attention to the 
risks, and people’s rather negative evaluations of the mitigation measures 
(see below). There is evidence that people in the province of Groningen 
feel uncertain about the future earthquakes and their possible 
consequences (Sociaal Planbureau Groningen, 2014a), which may sustain 
or even strengthen high perceived risks.  
 
5.4 Emotions 
Different from the media images, the emotions that people reported 
towards earthquakes caused by gas production, namely feeling fearful, 
angry, disappointed, uneasy, and terrible, were not extremely strong. 
Negative emotions were somewhat stronger – but not extremely strong – 
in regions more affected by the earthquakes. Most strikingly, people 
reported that they feel powerless when thinking about the earthquakes. 
Feeling powerless was the strongest negative emotion, strongest among 
people in most affected regions but also getting stronger over time in other 
regions (Figure 5.2). Negative emotions did not decrease over time and 
some got even stronger. 
The current study involved a representative sample of the population 
in the province of Groningen, which could explain why the negative 
emotions are not as strong as reported in the media. The emotion that 
stood out most was the relatively strong feeling of powerlessness. Other 
research has also pointed out the feeling of powerlessness and the feeling 
of being “left” among people affected by the earthquakes in Groningen 
(Sociaal Planbureau Groningen, 2014a). Together, the findings suggest 
that people in the province of Groningen feel that they themselves can do 
little against the risks of earthquakes.  
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Figure 5.2. Average values of feeling powerless when thinking  
                       about the earthquakes as a consequences of gas  
                       production from the Groningen gas field 
 
Source: Based on Perlaviciute et al. (2017).23 
 
5.5 Evaluations of mitigation measures 
People thought that the measures directly addressing the risks of 
earthquakes (e.g. reducing gas production around Loppersum, reinforcing 
houses) are somewhat more urgent than the measures aimed at increasing 
quality of life in the region (e.g. fast internet, renewable energy 
developments). People considered one particular measure – creating 
employment by hiring local companies to repair and reinforce houses – as 
particularly urgent and effective for strengthening the regional economy. 
Notably, while all measures were considered to be relatively urgent, people 
evaluated the implementation of these measures rather negatively.  
                                                          
23 For further details, see Perlaviciute et al. (2017) 
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Taken together, people evaluated the measures that address their 
highest perceived risks as most urgent, such as repairing damages and 
compensating for damages, followed by other measures to improve quality 
of life in the region in general. Similar findings have been reported from 
research with focus groups in the province of Groningen: when asked how 
to improve quality of life in the region, participants insisted that first the 
problems caused by gas production should be solved and then other 
measures can be implemented to improve quality of life (CMO STAMM / 
Sociaal Planbureau Groningen, 2016). In case there are additional 
resources to improve quality of life, people prioritize the building of 
earthquake-resistant homes and buildings, and supporting alternative 
energy sources and making buildings more sustainable (Sociaal 
Planbureau Groningen, 2016).  
Most importantly, our results suggest that people are not satisfied 
with how mitigation measures have been implemented. This could be for 
various reasons, for example because people think it takes much time and 
energy to claim and settle damages, repairing damages can be disturbing 
due to noise and chaos, and people may perceive mitigation measures as 
not transparent and unfair, among others (Sociaal Planbureau Groningen, 
2014b; CMO STAMM / Sociaal Planbureau Groningen, 2016). The way 
people evaluate mitigation measures could influence their evaluations of 
decision making process and perceived fairness of distribution of costs, 
risks, and benefits more generally. Initial evidence suggests that people in 
the province of Groningen think that their concerns are not being taken 
seriously (Sociaal Planbureau Groningen, 2014a; CMO STAMM / Sociaal 
Planbureau Groningen, 2016). Future research could study how changes 
in the implementation of mitigation measures, including reducing gas 
production, influence people’s evaluation of decision making and 




All in all, people in the province of Groningen are concerned about the 
risks of earthquakes, especially about the damages to properties and the 
image of the province of Groningen. People feel powerless when thinking 
about the earthquakes in Groningen, possibly because they think that they 
can do little themselves to prevent these risks and that responsible parties 
do not take their concerns seriously enough. This is further illustrated by 
the finding that people evaluate the implementation of mitigation 
measures rather negatively. It is important to study how future decisions 
regarding gas production in Groningen, including possibilities for a 
sustainable energy transition, influence risk perceptions and emotions of 
people in the province of Groningen.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
     Machiel Mulder and Peter Perey 
 
6.1 Changing views on Groningen gas production 
The discovery of the huge Groningen gas field with its unique flexibility 
characteristics had major consequences for the Dutch society. All houses 
became connected to the gas network and dependent on the L-gas from 
the Groningen gas field. The replacement of coal and oil by natural gas for 
heating raised the comfort of living as it was a cleaner carrier of energy. In 
addition, the swing capabilities of the Groningen gas field enabled the 
Dutch to base the energy demand for heating fully on natural gas without 
the need to build extensive storages, as several other European countries 
had to do, although some of them also benefited from the flexibility 
provided by the Groningen gas field. 
Moreover, the swing capacity made it possible to maximize the 
revenues by selling most of the gas at relatively high prices during (cold) 
winter times. This ability to benefit from high seasonal prices in 
combination with the relatively low production costs resulted in high 
profit margins. Consequently, the sales of natural gas to domestic and 
foreign consumers generated significant revenues for the shareholders 
and, in particular, the Dutch government. The annual revenues from gas 
production contributed to 15% of the total State revenues during the oil 
crises in the 1980s, while its share is still about 2%.  
Until a few years ago, however, there was not much attention for the 
downsides of the gas depletion of the Groningen field. The Huizinge 
earthquake of 2012, however, changed this completely. It became 
increasingly evident that the inhabitants of the Groningen region pay a 
high price for the gas production. Up to now, about 1,5 billion euro has 
been spent on the repairs for damages to houses resulting from the 
68 
 
earthquakes induced by gas production. In addition to this, it is estimated 
that the earthquakes have reduced the average value of houses by 2 to 4%. 
Besides these monetary costs, there are also social-psychological costs. It 
appears that people feel powerless when thinking about the earthquakes 
in Groningen, as they cannot not do much to prevent these risks, while 
they also believe that the responsible parties do not take their concerns 
seriously enough. 
Triggered by the increasingly intense protests from the Groningen 
region, the Dutch government has recently responded by taking the lead 
in the treatment of damage claims. In addition, the government has taken 
a fundamental decision regarding the Groningen gas field: in 2030 the gas 
production from these field will completely stop, although the gas reserves 
will still be about 250 bcm by that year. 
 
6.2 Transition of the region 
The decision to stop with the production of gas from the Groningen gas 
field gives a new perspective for the region. After being the major supplier 
of natural gas to the Northwest European gas market for about half a 
century, the region of Groningen has the opportunity to look for 
alternative economic activities. Being located in the rural region of the 
North of the Netherlands, close to the North Sea and with a well-developed 
infrastructure for energy business and research, the region Groningen 
may have a comparative advantage in the field of a transition towards 
renewable energy sources. As one should never waste a good crisis, the 
current political and social struggles with the gas production may act as 
an incentive to promote the region of Groningen as a supplier and 
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The discovery of the huge Groningen gas field with its unique flexibility 
characteristics had major consequences for the Dutch society. All houses became 
connected to the gas network and dependent on the L-gas from the Groningen gas 
field. The replacement of coal and oil by natural gas for heating raised the comfort 
of living as it was a cleaner carrier of energy. The capacity to produce in a highly 
flexible way made it possible to maximize the revenues by selling most of the 
gas at relatively high prices during (cold) winter times. Consequently, the sales of 
natural gas to domestic and foreign consumers generated significant revenues for 
the shareholders and, in particular, the Dutch government. 
Until a few years ago, however, there was not much attention for the downsides 
of the gas depletion of the Groningen field. The Huizinge earthquake of 2012, 
however, changed this completely. It became increasingly evident that the 
inhabitants of the Groningen region pay a high price for the gas production. 
In this paper, researchers of the University of Groningen reflect on the 
economic and social consequences of both the gas production and the resulting 
earthquakes. Attention is paid to the historical role of the Groningen gas field 
in the European gas market, the importance of the gas revenues for the Dutch 
economy, the impact of the earthquakes on the regional housing market as well 
as the social and psychological impact of the earthquakes and how the public 
authorities dealt with the concerns of the inhabitants of Groningen.
